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ABSTRACT 
In many of the existing equilibrium search models, sellers as 
a group are leaders and buyers as a group are followers to the extent 
that the latter are assumed to know the distribution of prices but not 
the price-seller correspondence before they make their information 
acquisition decisions. A natural way to weaken this strong version of 
"rational expectations" is to treat the problem as a aimul taneoua move 
game in which buyers must make their information acquisition decisions 
before they see the actual distribution of prices. Thia paper 
explores the implications of this modification of the existing 
literature in the context of Salop and Stiglitz's well-known model of 
monopoliatically competitive price dispersion ( 1 977 )  and the model of 
equilibrium comparison shopping due to Wilde and Schwartz ( 1979) , It 
considers both finitely many consumers and arbitrarily large numbers 
of consumers in both cases, and characterizes necessary and sufficient 
conditions for the existence of various mixed and pure strategy 
equilibria in each case, This yields a coherent integration of many 
of the known results as well as the derivation of a number of new 
results. 
EQUILIBRIUM SEARCH MODELS AS SIMULTANEOUS MOVE GAMES• 
Louis L. Wilde 
I 
1, INTRODUCTION 
During the past decade numerous equilibrium search models have 
appeared in the literature ( e.g., Butters, 1 977 ;  Salop and Stiglitz, 
1 977; Reinganum,  1 97 9; Wilde and Schwartz, 1 979; Varian, 1980 ) . In 
virtually all of the existing models sellers first set prices 
individually and then buyers respond in some fashion to the resulting 
market distribution of prices--sellers as a group are leaders and 
buyers as a group are followers. The equilibrium concept used is Nash 
between the individual sellers and Stackleberg between the sellers as 
a group and the buyers as a group. Moreover, buyers are often assumed 
to know the actual distribution or prices but not the price-seller 
correspondence before they make their information acquisition 
decisions. This combination of assumptions has been criticized 
( Schwartz and Wilde, 1 982 ) and efforts have been made to relax the 
latter or them, but these have not been particularly successful. This 
is due, in part, to the retained assumption of Stackleberg play. If, 
however, one assumes buyers make their information acquisition 
decisions before they see the actual distribution of prices, and 
combines this with the assumption of simUltaneous play, there obtains 
a natural weakening or the strong informational assumptions which 
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characterize the extant literature. 
This paper explores simultaneous move search models initially ! 
in the context of the well-known model of monopolistically competitive 
price dispersion due to Salop and Stiglitz ( 1979) , Subsequently a 
similar analysis is applied to a variation of the "monopoly" model due 
originally to Diamond ( 1 971 ) ,  This model will turn out to be closely 
related to the one studied by Wilde and Schwartz ( 1 979) . 
Section 2 states results for the Stackleberg version of 
Salop-Stiglitz, both in the case of finitely many consumers and the 
case of arbitrarily many consumers. Section 3 does the same for the 
simultaneous move version of Salop-Stiglitz. Section 4 repeats this 
sequence for a variant of the so-called monopoly model, and relates 
the results to Wilde-Schwartz. Since the assumption of finitely many 
consumers is the most realistic, care is taken to differentiate 
results between that case and the case of infinitely many consumers. 
Section S summarizes the results, relates them to the work of Burdett 
and Judd ( 1983 ) and Bagnoli ( 1985) , and concludes the paper. All 
formal proofs are in an appendix. 
In the simultaneous move version of Salop-Stiglitz, equilibria 
always exist, but oan take a variety of forms when the number of 
consumers is finite. There are pure strategy equilibria, symmetric 
mixed strategy equilibria, and blends or the two. The symmetric mixed 
strategy equilibria are always continuous ( except possibly for mass 
points at the competitive price) .  When the number of consumers is 
arbitrarily large, equilibria always exist, but all ( including 
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symmetric mixed strategy equilibria) are defined over just two prices, 
the competitive price and the monopoly price, In the simultaneous 
move version of the monopoly model ( hereafter referred to as Wilde­
Schwartz) equilibria always exist, but symmetric mixed strategy 
equilibria are necessarily continuous (except possibly for a mass 
point at the competitive price) ,  regardless of the number of 
consumers. The results in Section 4 also show that the equilibria 
analyzed in the original Wilde-Schwartz model, in which information 
acquisition decisions are exogenous, can be rationalized as symmetric 
mixed strategy equilibria for an appropriately defined simultaneous 
move search model in which information acquisition decisions are 
endogenous. Moreover, this can be done in both the case of finitely 
many consumers and the case of infinitely many consumers. 
2 .  THE SALOP-STIGLITZ MODEL: STACKLEBERG 
This section will state results for the Salop-Stiglitz model, 
first when there are a finite number of consumers and then when the 
number of consumers is arbitrarily large, in either case under the 
assumption that consumers see the distribution of prices but not the 
actual price-seller correspondence before making their information 
acquisition decisions. 
Consider a market for a homogeneous good in which each finn 
uses an identical technology, described by a fixed cost F and a 
constant marginal cost k. To yield a well-defined competitive price, 
firms are assumed to be able to produce any output up to a capacity 
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constraint s, after which costs become infinite. 
Consumers demand one unit of the good or none, and will pay up 
to L to obtain it. They also have the opp?rtunity to purchase the 
actual price-seller correspondence, which thus allows them to buy from 
one of the firms charging the lowest price in the market. A consumer 
who chooses not to purchase the price-seller correspondence purchases 
from a randomly selected firm, so long as the price does not exceed L. 
The cost of purchasing the price-seller correspondence can vary across 
1 consumers�M1 face cost c1 and M2 face cost c2, where c2 2 c1 > o. 
Define a =  M1/M, where M = M1 + Hi·
The only difference between this specification and that of 
Salop and Stiglitz is the parametrization of the average cost curve. 
F.quilibrium is given by a set of pricing decisions for the firms 
(possibly random) and a set of deci�ions for the consumers regarding 
purchase of the price-seller correspondence (also possibly random) , 
which together form a Nash equilibrium under the relevant timing 
assumptions. There is free entry so firms earn zero expected profits 
in equilibrium. Propositions 1 and 2 characterize pure-strategy 
equilibria, when they exist, under the assumption that consumers see 
the distribution of prices before they decide whether to purchase the 
price-seller correspondence. For notational convenience define pc as
the competitive price; i. e. , 
Pc E ( F/s) + k.
Denote the number of finns by N. Finally, to keep the model 
( 1 )  
s 
nontrivial, assume M > s and L > p0•
Proposition 1 :  Suppose a finite number of consumers see the 
distribution of prices before deciding whether to buy the price-seller 
correspondence. 
(a )  A sufficient condition for all firms charging L and 
N = M( L - k)  /F 
to be an equilibrium is 
L - P0 - o1 i F (L  - p0 ) /M(L - k) .
If 
a l [s ( L  - kl - FJ/[M( L  - kl - F] 
then ( 3l is also necessary. If ( 4l fails, necessary and 
sufficient conditions are 
a! MFo1/CM( L - kl - F][M( L  - k - o1l - F]
and 
L - P0 - o2 i F (L  - p0l/M( L  - kl.
( 2) 
( 3l 
( 4l 
( Sl 
( 6) 
( b )  A two-price equilibrium with P percent of the firms charging p0
and (1 - Pl percent charging L where 
P = [a/(1 - al]{F/[s ( L  - kl - F]) ( 7l 
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and 
N = ( 1  - a)M(L - k ) /F ( 8 )  
exists if and only if 
o2 l [L - p0 - a(L - k)J/( 1 - a) > o1 ( 9) 
and 
M > aF/( 1 - a)[ (L  - p0 - o1l - a (L  - kl]. ( 10 )  
( ol A two-price equilibrium with p percent of the firms charging p0
and ( 1  - Pl percent charging p0 + [o2/ ( 1  - Pl1 < L where
p = Fa/[Fa + o2( 1  - als]
and 
N = M[F + o2( 1  - alsJ/Fs
exists if .and only if 
[L - p0 - a(L  - klJ/( 1  - al > c2
and 
� > aF/( 1 - al<o2 - o1l
( dl If none of the equilibria defined above exist, ·there is no 
equilibrium. 2
( 11l 
( 12l 
( 13l 
( 14l 
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Remark 1: The equilibria described in Proposition 1 are pure-strategy 
equilibria. If one allows mixed strategies on the consumer side, 
Salop and Stiglitz observe that two-price equilibria are possible when 
c1 = c2• In this case (14)  can never hold, but ( 9) can just if
a = (L - Pc - c)/ (L  - k - c ) ( 15 )  
where o1 = o = o2 and a is the equilibrium mixed strategy for 
consumers, which now takes the place of a. Also, there are some 
parameter values for which (10 )  holds for all M > O, but ( 14 )  is 
always nontrivial ( i. e. ,  the right-hand side is strictly positive) ,  
In any case, there are a large range of parameter values for which no 
pure strategy equilibrium exists, and others for which the equilibrium 
is not unique. Letting the number of consumers get arbitrarily large 
will solve the latter problem, but not the former. 
The reader is referred to Salop and Stiglitz for a detailed 
discussion of Proposition 1 ,  but the intuition is quite simple, The 
only possible single-price equilibrium is at the monopoly price since 
no one buys the price-seller correspondence when there is no price 
dispersion, thus making small price increases profitable unless the 
single price equilibrium is at L. All firms charging the monopoly 
price is an equilibrium, though, only when it is impossible for a 
single firm to induce shopping by lowering its price, or, if it is, 
the resulting increase in demand is insufficient to compensate the 
firm for the price decrease. The only other possible equilibria are 
two-price equilibria. This is because consumers decide whether to buy 
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the price-seller correspondence after they see the distribution of 
prices, Hence, given pure strategies, demand can only take on one of 
two values, high or low, and zero-profits thus implies at most two 
prices in equilibrium, A high price less than the monopoly price is 
possible in this case if the high coat consumers are just indifferent 
between buying the price-seller correspondence and random purohase, 
since;any price increase would then induce them to shop. Otherwise
the high price is at the monopoly price L. In either case these two­
price equilibria must be such that price decreases sufficient to cause 
low cost consumers to prefer random purchase must not be profitable, 
just as in the monopoly equilibrium. In either kind of two-price 
equilibrium, the low price is the competitive price since otherwise 
any small price decrease (say some e > 0) would induce a discontinuous 
jump in demand, Thus there is an e small enough to make such a 
strategy profitable, unless the (common) low price equals p0,
Remark 2: The possibility of equilibria involving mixed strategies 
for the firms cannot be ruled out, indeed they are likely to exist in 
many oases. But they are exceedingly difficult to characterize. It 
is, however, easy to show that all firms using p as defined in either 
( 7 ) or ( 11 )  of Proposition 1 as a mixed strategy cannot be part of an 
equilibrium in which N is given by ( 8) and (12) ,  respectively, so long 
as M is finite,3
Proposition 2 :  Suppose consumers see the distribution of prices 
before deciding whether to buy the price-seller correspondence. Let 
the number of consumers be arbitrarily large and denote the 
consumer/firm ratio by a = M/N. 
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{a) A necessary and sufficient condition for all firms charging L and 
a =F/( L - k) ( 16 )  
to  be an  equilibrium is 
L - Pc < c1• ( 17 )  
( b )  A two price equilibrium with P percent of  the firm charging p0
and ( 1 - p )  percent charging L where 
P = a(pc - k) /{1 - a) ( L  - Pc> ( 18 )  
and 
a =  F/( 1 - a) ( L  - k )  ( 19) 
exists if and only if 
c2 i [L - p0 - a( L - k ) J /( 1  - a) l o1• ( 20) 
(c) If neither (17 )  nor (20 )  hold, no equilibrium in pure strategies 
exists. 4
The proof of this proposition follows straightforwardly from taking 
limits in Proposition 1 .  Two-price equilibria with the high price 
being less than L are now impossible because any firm charging the 
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high price could raise its price to  L without inducing the high cost 
consumers to buy the price-seller correspondence when the number of 
firms is arbitrarily large ( which it must be given zero profits and an 
arbitrarily large number of consumers) .  
Remark 3: Unlike the case in which the number of consumers is finite, 
it seems intuitively plausible that all firms using a mixed strategy 
of p as given in ( 18) when a is given by ( 19) should constitute an 
equilibrium when the number of consumers is arbitrarily large. It is 
shown in the appendix that this in fact is true. Moreover, this is 
the only symmetric mixed strategy equilibrium. 
The significance or Remark 3 is that one may consider the 
assumption of a finite number of consumers rather than Stackleberg 
behavior as the main stumbling block to characterizing mixed strategy 
equilibria for those ranges of parameter values where pure strategy 
equilibria fail to exist. As will be shown below, this is not the 
case in the simultaneous move version of this model. 
3 .  THE SALOP-STIGLITZ MODEL : SIMUL TANEOUS MOVE 
While the assumption that consumers see the distribution of 
prices before making their information acquisition decisions has been 
criticized as unrealistic, efforts to relax it have been relatively 
unsuccessful because they have typically maintained the Stackleberg 
hypothesis and focused on learning of one kind or another. But the 
sort of markets these models attempt to describe using static game­
theoretic concepts are inherently dynamic. How it is that consumers 
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come to know the actual distribution of prices but not the price­
seller correspondence, or some portion of it, in such settings is 
really quite mysterious. It is considerably more realistic to assume 
they come to learn the general pricing strategy in a market, but do 
not know what actual prices prevail at any given time until they make 
an information acquisition decision. In this formulation of the 
Salop-Stiglitz model, for example, firms are led quite naturally to 
use mixed strategies, as will be shown below. 
Proposition 3:  Suppose a finite number of consumers must decide 
whether to buy the price-seller correspondence before they know the 
distribution of actual prices. 
( a )  All firms charging the monopoly price L and 
N = M( L - k)  /F 
will always be an equilibrium, 
( 21 )  
( b )  A two-price equilibrium with p percent of the firms charging pc
and (1 - p) percent charging L where 
and 
P a(pc - k) /( 1  - a) ( L  - Pc>
N M(L - k) ( l  - a) /F 
exists if and only if 
c2 L CL - Pc - a(L - k ) J /( 1 - a) > c1•
5
( 22) 
( 23 )  
( 24)  
1 2 
Proposition 3 is virtually identical to Proposition 2, which 
describes equilibria in the Stackleberg version of Salop-Stiglitz when 
there are arbitrarily many consumers. The reason why is immediate�in 
the simultaneous move game firms take consumers• strategies as given. 
Thus, for example, if all firms charge the monopoly price, no one will 
buy the price-seller correspondence, A deviant firm therefore can 
never expect to make positive profits. Hence L - p0 < o1 is not
required as in Proposition 2 . For two-price equilibria, the high 
price can never be less than the monopoly price, again because any 
firm changing the high price could then raise its price to L without 
expecting there to be any affect on consumer behavior. Moreover, the 
sole requirement for there to be a two-price equilibrium with the high 
price equal to the monopoly price is that only the low cost consumers 
buy the price-seller correspondence. There is no issue of deviant 
firms inducing the low cost consumers to purchase randomly. 
While, in a sense, the guaranteed existence of a single price 
equilibrium at the monopoly price in the simultaneous version of 
Salop-Stiglitz "solves" the nonexistence problem inherent in the 
Stackleberg version, intuitively it is still not very appealing,6
However, the next results show that for a large range of values of o1
and c2' mixed strategy equilibria will also exist in the latter. · 
Proposition 4: Suppose a finite number of consumers must decide 
whether to buy the price-seller corres pondence before they know the 
distribution of actual prices. If c1 = c = c2, then for any a, where
a is the probability a consumer buys the price-seller correspondence, 
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such that 
0 < a < 1 - [F/s(L - k ) J  (25 )  
there exists a cost c, where O < c < L - pc' such that G(p), defined
below,  and a,form a mixed strategy equilibrium, given 
N = M(l - a)(L - k) /F. 
(a ) If a > [s(L - k) - F) /H(L - k) then 
G(p) 
O for P < Pc 
� for Pc � p ! q 
where� a (0,1) uniquely solves 
( 1  - a )  + (a;a)[l - ( 1  - � ) NJ = s(l - a)(L - k) /F,
and for q < p i L, 
G(p) = 1 - [F(L - p) /Ma(L - k)(p - k ) J l/N-1
A 
where q s (pc,L) uniquely solves G(q) = Q, 
A 
(b) If a i [s(L - k)  - FJ /M(L - k)  then G(p) = O for pip and is 
A 
given by (28) for p i p i L where 
�=[FL+ aM(L - k)kJ /[Ma(L - k) + F) . 
In either case c is defined by 
Eo(P) - Ea <PminlN> = c
(26 )  
(27 )  
(28) 
(29 )  
(30) 
where E0(P) is the mean of G(• ) and E0(PminlN> is the expected
value of the minimum price given N observations from G( • ) ,  
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The surprising aspect of Proposition 4 is that symmetric mixed 
strategy equilibria are not defined over just pc and L--there may or 
may not be a mass point at the competitive price, but there is al ways 
an interval of prices extending up to  the monopoly price over which 
prices are continuously distributed. The intuition behind this result 
is simple. When the number of consumers is finite, so is the number 
of firms. If there were a mass point above the competitive price, say 
at the monopoly price, there would be a nonzero probabil ity that all 
firms charge that price. But in the simultaneous move game, consumers 
would still have bought the price-seller correspondence with 
probability a; on average, aM consumers would be shoppers. Thus, if 
any firm shifted some probabili ty to a slightly lower price, say L - s 
for some e > O, there would be a discontinuous jump in its expected 
demand because it would get all shoppers when it charged L - a and all 
others charged L. For some e > O this must yield an increase in 
expected profit. The same argument applies for any price greater than 
Pc• Even though there cannot be a mass point at the monopoly price, L
must still be in the support of the symmetric mixed strategy since a 
firm that actually charges the highest price gets only consumers who 
buy randomly (the probability someone else charges a lower price is 
one ) ,  Zero expected profits then implies [aM(L - k ) /NJ  - F = o, which 
defines N.7 The rest of the proposition follows immediately as in 
Wilde and Schwartz (1979 ) ,  except for the definition of c, To sustain 
a distribution G in equilibrium, consumers must be indifferent to 
buying the price-seller correspondence and random purchase. Hence 
(30) must hold. So long as all the mass of G is not concentrated at 
the competitive price or the monopoly price, E0 ( P) - E0 ( Pmin
1Nl > o. 
Condition ( 25 )  is necessary and sufficient for this to be the case 
(again, see Wilde and Schwartz, 1 979) . Thus the needed c > o must 
exist. 
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Remark 4 :  Proposition 4 is not quite as strong as one would like. The 
converse is really what is desired; i. e. , we would like to know for 
what information acquisition costs (c)  a symmetric mixed-strategy 
equilibrium exists. This can be done, but it's not particularly 
enlightening. Consider Figure 1 .  Let 
( 31 )  
Since H ( O) = O H(a ) ,  where a =  1 - [F/s( L  - kl] , and H ( a) > O for 
all a s  (0,a), H( • ) must achieve a maximum on [O,;J, say at a•. Let 
c•. Then for any c s ( O,c•) there exist at least two 
equilibria, and at c• there exists at least one. We can say that 
c• < L - Pc' but that is all. However, the observation that for any
c s ( O,o•) there are at least two equilibria is itself interesting. 
Suppose, for the sake of argument, that H (a )  is uni-modal. 8 Then for
any c less than o•, there are precisely two equilibria, aL and aH'
where aL < aH. At aL' G( p)  will be concentrated toward higher prices,
and at aH' G( p )  will be concentrated toward lower prices. Price
dispersion, however, as measured by H, will be the same, In the 
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limit, as c goes to zero, only the equilibria characterized by aH
converge to an equilibrium, one in which all prices are competiti�e. 
More importantly, though, the comparative statics of these equilibria 
will be quite different. For example, at aL' aE (PJ/ac < O and at aH,
aE(P)  /ac > o. 
The next proposition considers the analogue 'to Proposition 4 
when o2 c1 > o. Proposition 6 will state results when the number of 
consumers is arbitrarily large. 
Proposition S: Suppose a finite number of consumers must decide 
whether to buy the price-seller correspondence before they know the 
distribution of actual prices. Let information acquisition costs be 
c2 > c1 > O, and let ai be the probability that a consumer with costs
ci buys the price-seller correspondence.
(a )  For any a1 s ( 0,1 ) such that
0 < a1 < [s ( L  - k) - FJ/as ( L  - k ), ( 3 2 )  
there exists a cost c1, where O < o1 < L - p0, such that G ( p ) ,
defined below, and a1 form a mixed strategy equilibrium, given
O, and 
N M(1 - a ) (L  - k ) /F, ( 33 )  
( i) If «1 ) [s ( L  -k) - FJ/aM( L - k) then
{;
for p < Po
G(p)  
for Pc .{ P .{ q
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where 8 uniquely solves 
(1 - aa1) + (aa1/o)[1 - (1 - g)
N]
= s(l - aa1 )(L - k ) /F, (34) 
and for q < p i L, 
G(p) = 1 - [F(L - p )/Maa1(L - k)(p - k)]
l/N-1, ( 3 5 )  
where q uniquely solves G(q) = g, 
,. 
(ii) If a1 i [s(L - k)  - Fl/aM(L - k)  then G(p) = O for p < p 
,. 
and is given by ( 35 )  for p i p i L, where
,. 
p = [FL+ aa1M(L - k )kl/[Maa1(L - k) + F] .
In either case c1 is defined by
Ea(P ) - Ea(PminlN >  = c1 
where the expectations are as in Proposition 4 .  
(b) For any a2 e (0,1)  such that 
a2 < [s(l - a )(L - k) - Fl/(1 - a)s(L - k), 
(36) 
(37)  
( 38) 
there exists a cost c2, where 0 < c2 < L - Pc• such that G(p),
defined below, and a2 form a mixed strategy equilibrium, given 
c1 < c2, a1, and
N = M(l - a)(l - a2) (L - k) /F. 
(i) If a2 > [(s - aM)(L - k) - FJ /M(l - a)(L - k) then 
( 39 )  
{ O for P < Pc
G(p) = 
g for Pc i p < q
where 8 uniquely solves 
� A N (1 - a )(l - a2) +{[a+ (1 - a)a2J 1ul[l - (1 - G) ]
= a(l - a)(l - a2)(L - k ) /F 
and for q ! p i L, 
I 1/N-1 G(p )  = 1 - {F(L - p) M(p - k)(L - k)[a + (1 - a )a2 J }  , 
where q uniquely solves G(q ) = -a. 
(ii) If a2 i [(s - aM)(L - k)  - Fl/M(l - a )(L -'k), then 
G(p) = O for p < � and is given by (41) for � ! p i L, 
where 
,. 
p = 
{FL + M(L - k)[a + (1 - ala2lk} 
{M(L - k)[a + (1 - a)a2J + F) ' 
In either case, c2 is defined by 
Ea(P) - Ea(PminlN > = c2' 
where the expectations are as in Proposition 4, 
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(40) 
( 41) 
( 42) 
( 43 )  
The logic of  Proposition S follows closely that of Proposition 
4 and need not be repeated . It is also the case that there exist 
• • 
values of c1 and c2, say c1 and c2, such that type (a ) equilibria
• 
exist for all c1 and c2 such that c1 i min{c1.c2} and type (b)' 
• 
equilibria exist for all c1 and c2 such that c1 < c2 i c2 • Not only
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are these equilibria nonunique within types, they may overlap across 
• • 
the two types; e. g. , any pair c1 and c2 such that c1 < c2 < min(c1 , c2
J
will support both types of equilibria. In the finite case it is 
difficult to relate these equilibria to the pure-strategy equilibria 
• • described in Proposition 3, as little can be said about c1 and c2
except that they exist, However, as the number of consumers gets 
large, the symmetric mixed strategy equilibria will exist precisely 
when the pure-strategy two-price equilibria fail to exist; i. e. , when 
(24)  does not hold. 
Remark 5 :  The essence of Propositions 4 and 5 is that there can never 
be a mass point except possibly at the competitive price when the 
number of consumers is finite, given symmetric mixed strategies. Thia 
is because there is always the chance of direct competition between 
firms for consumers who have purchased the price-seller 
correspondence. However, if even one firm pursues a pure strategy of 
charging the competitive price this argument fails. In fact, the only 
potential equilibria must then necessarily involve pricing strategies 
over just Pc and L. The following example is formally derived in the
appendix. Suppose one firm always charges the competitive price. 
Then the following three equations characterize a symmetric 
equilibrium mixed strategy for the remaining N - 1 firms ( p ) , an 
equilibrium number of firms (N ) , and an equilibrium mixed strategy for 
consumers ( a ) ,  given c2 = c = c1, where c > O :
( M/N) {l - a+ [a/p2CN - 1 ) ]  [ ( 1  - p ) N - ( 1  - PN) ] )  s, ( 44)  
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(M/N) ( l  - a ) ( L  - k) = F, 
(1  - p ) ( N  - 1 ) ( L  - pc) = cN.
( 45 )  
(46) 
Here ( 44)  and ( 45 )  derive from zero profits at pc and L, respectively,
and (46) derives from the consumers' choice problem. It is tedious 
and unenlightening to characterize when these equations have a 
solution, but the following numerical example shows the possibility of 
such equilibria. Let M = 12, L = 3 ,  F = 40/11,  k = 3 /11,  s = 5,  and 
c = 1 .  Then N = 3 ,  and a =  2/3 and p = 1/4 are equilibrium symmetric 
mixed strategies for the consumers and the two firms who do not always 
charge the competitive price, respectively. There are also blends of 
pure and mixed strategies in which some firms always charge the 
monopoly price. For example, suppose one firm always charges L. Then 
if c1 = c = c2, an equilibrium will exist under the same conditions as
given in Proposition 4 where N is given by ( 26 )  and N - 1 replaces N 
in the definition of G (p ) , the symmetric mixed strategy for those 
firms playing mixed strategiea. In fact, such an asymmetric 
equilibrium will exist when any m firms play a pure strategy of 
charging L and the remaining N - m firms play a mixed strategy given 
by G (p )  in Proposition 4, where N - m replaces N . 9
The examples given in Remark 5 are important for two reasons. 
They suggests that there are a wide variety of equilibria in the 
simultaneous move version of the Salop-Stiglitz model when there are 
finitely many consumers. But more importantly, one might expect 
markets to gravitate to equilibria in which some firms pursue pure 
strategies and some pursue mixed strategies. The symmetric mixed 
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strategy equilibria described in Propositions 4 and S are rather 
delicately balanced�the support of the equilibrium mixed strategy in 
each covers infinitely many prices and all firms must pursue the 
sophisticated pricing rules they imply. But if some firms "give up" 
and simply charge the competitive price, for example, then the 
remaining firms' problems are greatly simplified�they need only 
decide between pc and L. 
The final result of this section considers the analogue to 
Propositions 4 and S as the number of consumers gets arbitrarily 
large, 
Proposition 6: Suppose consumers must decide whether to buy the 
price-seller correspondence before they know the distribution of 
actual prices. Let the number of consumers be arbitrarily large and 
denote the consumer/firm ratio by a = M/N, Let p be the probability a 
firm charges p0 and 1 - p the probability it charges L.
(a )  If c1 = c = c2, where c > O ,  then a unique symmetric mixed
strategy equilibrium exists if L - p0 2 o. It is given by 
and 
a = ( L  - p0 - o) /( L  - k - c )
p = ( L  - Pc - o) /( L  - p0) ,
a =  s (L  - k - o ) /( L  - k) , 
( 47 ) 
( 48) 
( 49) 
( b )  If  c2 > c1 > O ,  then a unique mixed strategy equilibrium exists
if L - Pc 2 c2, Three cases are possible. Define
a1 = ( L  - pc - c1 > /<L - k - c1>
and 
a2 = ( L  - p0 - c2) /( L  - k - o2)
( i) If a < a1 , then a1 = 1 ,
and 
( L  - p0 - o2) - aoL - k - c2)
( 1  - a) ( L  - k - c2)
p = ( L  - p0 - c2) / ( L  - p0) ,
( ii) If 8i i a ! a2, then a1 = 1 ,  a2 = 0 and
p = a(p0 - k )/ ( 1  - a) ( L - Pc> •
( iii) If a > a2, then a2 = O,
·a  = (L - p - o > /a (L  - k - c )1 0 1 1 
and 
P = ( L  - Pc - cl) /( L  - pc) .
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( SO) 
( S1 ) 
( S2) 
( S3 ) 
( S4) 
(SS) 
( S6 ) 
Proposition 6 shows that in the case of an arbitrarily large number of 
consumers, mixed strategy equilibria always exist when L - p0 2 c2•
If L - Pc < c2, then oases ( ii) and ( iii) are still possible, The
interesting comparison here is with Propositions 2 and 3 which deal 
with pure strategy equilibria in the Stackleberg model given 
arbitrarily many consumers, and the simultaneous move model given a 
finite number of consumers, respectively. In those propositions, 
two-price equilibria exist if and only if 
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c2 i [L - Po - a(L - k) J/(t - a) l Ct ( 57 ) 
But this constraint is identical to at i a ! a2 in Proposition 6.
Thus whenever two-price equilibria in pure strategies fail to exist, 
mixed strategy equilibria will exist so long as L - Pc 2 o2 when the
number of consumers is arbitrarily large, given simultaneous decisions 
by consumers and firms, Furthermore, in this case the pure strategy 
equilibria of Proposition 3 can justly be reinterpreted as mixed 
strategy equilibria, at least so far as firms are concerned. 
While the limiting case gives sharp results, and yields unique 
types of symmetric mixed strategy equilibria over the various ranges 
of the underlying parameters, it must be viewed with some caution, As 
Propositions 4 and 5 show, the finite case is not well-represented by 
the limiting case; in the former the nature of the equilibria are 
quite different than in the latter, the conditions for existence are 
stronger, and the possibility of multiple equilibria are virtually a 
certainty. 
4 ,  THE WILDE-SCHWARTZ HODEL 
An equilibrium search model closely related to the Salop and 
Stiglitz model analyzed in Sections 2 and 3 is a variation on the 
"monopoly" model originally due to Diamond (t971 ) ,  discussed later by 
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Butters (t977) and most recently by Burdett and Judd (t983 ) .  The 
information acquisition technology is similar to that specified by 
Sa1op and Stiglitz, but rather than seeing the entire price-seller 
correspondence when the information acquisition cost o is paid, 
consumers see only a random sample of that correspondence of size n, 
where n l 2 . The other assumptions of Sections 2 and 3 remain intact, 
This �odification yields a model which is closely related to the model 
analyzed by Wilde and Schwartz (t979) , The exact relationship will be 
spelled out below in Propositions 9 and to and Remark 6 ,  First, 
however, the Staokleberg version of the model will be analyzed for 
both a finite number of consumers and an arbitrarily large number of 
consumers. Only the case of o2 = c = ct• where c > o, will be
considered, to
Proposition 7: Suppose a finite number of consumers see the 
distribution of prices before deciding whether to buy a sample of size 
n from the price-seller correspondence, where 
n .{ (L - k) H/F. 
(a) All firms changing L is an equilibrium if 
cl (n - t) (L - p0) F/(L - k ) H  
( 58) 
( 59)
(b) If (59) fails, a necessary and sUfficient condition for all firms 
charging L to be an equilibrium is 
c > (n - t> 2F/nH. ( 60) 
( c )  I f  neither case ( a )  nor ( b )  obtains there is n o  equilibrium. 
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Proposition 7 is very similar to case (a)  of Proposition 1 in 
which n = N, and the logic of the argument follows the same intuition. 
In fact, when n = N, case (b )  of Proposition 7 cannot hold so ( 59) is 
necessary as well as sufficient for a "monopoly" equilibrium, and ( 59) 
reduces to! ( 3 ) . Similarly, when the number of consumers is
arbitrarily large, ( 59)  is equivalent to c > O, so the monopoly 
equilibrium always obtains as the unique equilibrium. Thus we have 
the following analogue to Proposition 2 , 
Proposition 8: Suppose consumers see the distribution of prices 
before deciding whether to buy a sample of size n from the price-
seller correspondence, Let the number of consumers be arbitrarily 
large. Then all firms charging the monopoly price is the unique 
equilibrium. 11
The next two propositions deal with the simultaneous move 
version of this model. They are based largely on Wilde and Schwartz 
( 1 97 9) . 
Proposition 9: Suppose a finite number of consumers must decide 
whether to buy a sample of size n from the price-seller correspondence 
before they see the distribution of actual prices, 
( a) All firms charging the monopoly price is always an equilibrium. 
( b )  If ( 53 )  holds ( i. e. ,  n ! M(L - k) /F ) ,  then for any a, where a is 
the pr9bability a consumer buys the sample of size from the 
price-seller correspondence, such that 
0 < a < 1 - [F /s ( L  - k) J 
there exists a cost c, where O < c < L - p0, such that G( p ) ,
defined as in Wilde and Schwartz ( 1979) , and a form a mixed 
strategy equilibrium, given 
N = M( L - k) ( 1  - a ) /F. 
In particular, 
( i) If a > [s( L  - k) - FJ/[s ( L  - k) + ( n  - 1 ) FJ then 
G ( p )  
O for P < Pc
ft for P0 ! p ! q
where e uniquely solves
( 1  - a) + ( a/8) £1 - ( 1  - 1?) n] = s ( l  - a ) ( L  - k) /F 
and for q i p i L, 
G( p )  = 1 - (( 1 - a ) ( L  - p )/an( p  - k)Jl/n-1
where q uniquely solves G ( q) = a. 
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(61 )  
( 62) 
(63)  
(64)  
( ii) If a i [s ( L  - k )  - FJ/[s(L - k) + (n - l) F], then G ( p )  = O 
A A 
for p ! p and is given by ( 64)  for p ! p ! L, where
A 
p = [ ( 1  - a ) L  + ankJ/[1 - a+ an], ( 65 )  
In either case c is given by 
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( 66)  
Remark 6 :  While Proposition 9 is closely related to Theorem 1 in 
Wilde and Schwartz, it actually eliminates the two primary weaknesses 
of that model--that the sample sizes are exogenous and when 
competitive equilibria fail to exist there are no pure-strategy 
equilibria if the number of consumers is finite. Proposition 9 shows 
that for any noncompetitive equilibrium in the Wilde-Schwartz model, 
there exists an information acquisition cost which rationalizes the 
exogenous shopper/nonshopper ratio and the endogenous price­
distribution given in their Theorem 1 as a symmetric mixed strategy 
equilibrium. Furthermore, this holds whether the number of consumers 
is finite or arbitrarily large (nothing in Proposition 9 except the 
number of firms depends on the number of consumers-the consumer/firm 
ratio is constant at a =  F/(1 - a) ( L  - k) , regardless of H) . In other 
words, if one views the equilibrium price distribution in Wilde and 
Schwartz as a symmetric mixed strategy equilibrium instead of a 
distribution of pure strategies, then it applies to the case of 
finitely many consumers as well as the case of arbitrarily many 
consumers. 12
Based on Remark 6, a final proposition is immediate. 
Proposition 10: Suppose consumers must decide whether to buy a sample 
of size n from the price-seller correspondence before they see the 
actual distribution of prices. Let the number of consumers be 
arbitrarily large. 
(a )  All firms charging the monopoly price is  always an  equilibrium. 
(b )  For any a such that ( 61 )  holds, there exists a cost c, where 
0 < c < L - Pc' such that a and G (p )  defined exactly aa in
Proposition 9 form a mixed strategy equilibrium given 
a =  F/( L  - (k ) ( l  - a). Again c must satisfy ( 66) . 
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While Proposition 9 ( the simultaneous move version of Wilde­
Schwartz with a finite number of consumers) is similar to Proposition 
4 ( the analogous version of Salop-Stiglitz) ,  Proposition 10  ( the 
simultaneous move version of Wilde-Schwartz with arbitrarily many 
consumers) is quite unlike Proposition 6, part a ( the analogous 
version of Salop-Stiglitz) . In the Salop-Stiglitz model, n = N, so as 
the number of consumers, and thus firms, gets arbitrarily large, so 
does the number of firms sampled by those who buy the price-seller 
correspondence, thus driving symme'tric mixed strategies for the firms
to be defined over just p0 and L in the limiting case. In the Wilde­
Schwartz model, n stays constant as N gets large, so symmetric mixed 
strategies for the firms are continuous ( except possibly for mass 
points at pc) '  even in the limit. Thus, in the Wilde-Schwartz model
the equilibrium given an arbitrarily large number of consumers is much 
more representative of the equilibrium given a finite number of 
consumers than is the case with the Salop-Stiglitz model. 
5. CONCLUSION 
In the models considered in this paper, denying consumers 
access to the actual ( or realized ) distribution of prices before they 
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make their information acquisition decisions yields a surprisingly 
rich set of results, but three general conolusions seem most 
significant. First, the Salop-Stiglitz model with a finite number of 
consumers has equilibria of a variety of types which often coexist: 
pure strategy, symmetric mixed strategy, and blends of the two. 
Second, equilibria in the Wilde-Schwartz model can be "rationalized" 
as mixed-strategy equilibria of an appropriately defined simultaneous 
move game in which consumers' information acquisition decisions are 
endogenous. Moreover, the price distributions described by Schwartz 
and Wilde can be viewed as symmetric mixed strategy equilibria when 
there are finitely many consumers as well as arbitrarily many 
consumers under precisely the same conditions. 
Finally, it has been shown that in the simultaneous move 
models, the form of equilibria when there are arbitrarily many 
consumers do not necessarily reflect the form of equilibria when there 
are finitely many consumers, For example, when mixed strategy 
equilibria exist in the latter models (either Salop-Stiglitz or 
Wilde-Schwartz) they are generally not unique, A given information 
acquisition cost can usually support at least two equilibria, one with 
prices concentrated near the competitive price and one with prices 
concentrated near the monopoly price ( loosely speaking) , Comparative 
statics will then depend on which equilibrium one considers; e. g. , for 
some equilibria an increase in search costs can .!2H§!'. the average 
price charged by firms, 
These results are related to, but distinct from, those 
3 0  
presented by Burdett and Judd (1983 ) and Bagnoli ( 1985 ) ,  Burdett and 
Judd analyze several equilibrium search models, all of which assume 
firms' technologies are described by a constant marginal cost, no 
fixed cost, and no capacity constraint. The consumer/firm ratio is 
taken as fixed and, in equilibrium, is replaced by an endogenous level 
of profits. They also assume arbitrarily many consumers. Under 
fixed-sample-size search, they then establish an analogue to 
Proposition 9 with n = 2 , 
Bagnoli considers a version of Salop-Stiglitz in which the 
shopper/nonshopper mix is taken as given; i. e., some consumers always 
buy from one of the lowest-priced firms and the rest buy from a 
randomly selected firm. Given finitely many consumers, he 
characterizes symmetric mixed strategy equilibria for firms 
( Propositions 4 and 5 in this paper) and one form of asymmetric 
equilibria (as in Remark s�see footnote 9) , However, he fails to 
connect these equilibria to the information acquisition decision of 
consumers or relate them to the oase in which consumers are only 
partially informed, 
The results presented in this paper suggest that a great deal 
of caution must be used in applying equilibrium search models to 
real-world problems. Perhaps the most realistic specification of 
those analyzed is the simultaneous move version of Wilde-Schwartz with 
a finite number of consumers, But this model still has a serious 
nonuniqueness problem. Sorting out the equilibria at a theoretical 
level will likely require more sophisticated equilibrium concepts. 
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Empirically, the models are notoriously hard to test, and while some 
progress is being made using laboratory experiments (see Grether, 
Schwartz, and Wilde (1983 ) for some initial results) ,  much work 
remains. 
APPENDIX 
Proof of Proposition 1:  
case (a). Suppose all firms charge L. Zero profits then implies 
32 
N = M( L - k) /F. This will be an equilibrium if and only if no firm
can induce consumers to buy the price-seller correspondence by 
lowering its price, or, if it can, the resulting profits are 
nonpositive. Low cost consumers are indifferent to buying the price-
seller correspondence and random purchase precisely at price 
A 
P1 = L - CN/CN - 1 ) Jc1• ( Al) 
A 
That P1 is less than or equal to Pc is always sufficient for charging
A 
P1 to be unprofitable, Using N = M( L - k) /F this reduces to ( 3 ) .  If
A 
P1 > Pc• resulting demand is 
( 1  - a) (M/N) + aM.
A 
If ql 2. s, then ( 3 )  is also necessary. Substituting for N in (A2)
A 
gives ( 4 ) .  I f  q1 < s: i. e. , if ( 4) fails, we require
"' "' 
( pl - k ) ql - F .{ O, which is 
holds so 
A 
changing p1 yields 
equivalent to ( 5 ) .  However, even if 
nonposi tive profits, it may still be 
( A2) 
( 5 )  
possible to earn positive profits by inducing Al], consumers t o  shop. 
"' "' 
To prevent this we require P2 .{ Pc where p2 is the price at which high
cost consumers are indifferent to buying the price-seller 
correspondence and random purchase; i.e. 
A 
P2 = L - CN/( N - l ) Jc2•
Using ( A3 ) ,  �2 <Pc reduces to ( 6 ) ,13
Consider now two-price equilibria. In this case low cost 
consumers must buy the price-seller correspondence while high cost 
consumers purchase randomly. If this is the case, zero profits 
implies 
Ph = [FN/(1  - a) H] + k
and 
Pt = [FflN/( fl  - afl + a) H] + k
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( A3 )  
( A4 )  
( AS )  
where Ph and Pt are the high and low price, respectively, and the
right-hand-side of ( A4 )  and ( AS )  are the average costs at the expected 
demand facing each type of firm; fl is the proportion changing Pt•
Following Salop and Stiglitz, it is immediate that Pt = pc and
Ph� min{L, p0 + Co2/ ( 1  - fl) )};
i.e., the high price is either the limit price or that price which
( A6) 
keeps high cost consumers indifferent between buying the price-seller 
correspondence and random purchase, 
case (b). Suppose p0 + [c2/( 1  - fl) ) l L. Then ph = L. Hence ( A4 )
and ( AS )  become 
[FN/( 1  - a)M) + k = L ( A7) 
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and 
( fl  - fla + a )H/flN = s, ( AB) 
the latter by definition of Pc. Equations ( A7)  and ( AB) yield' fl and N
as given in (7 )  and ( B) .  The low cost consumers prefer buying the 
price-seller correspondence and high cost consumers prefer random 
search requires 
c2 l (1 - fl) ( L  - Pc> > c1• ( A9 )  
Using ( 7 )  this gives ( 9) .  Since L > p0, fl is clearly positive. It is
less than 1 by virtue of ( A9 ) ,  Hence ( 7 )  and ( B) are an equilibrium 
if and only if no firm can lower its price sufficiently to induce low 
cost consumers to cease buying the price-seller correspondence. The 
price which makes low cost consumers indifferent is given by 
A 
p = L - N[( l  - fl) ( L  - p0) - 011. ( AlO) 
Demand will jump for the deviant firm to M/N since no one buys the 
price-seller correspondence. Thus we require average cost at M/N to 
A 
exceed p, or 
L - N[( l  - fl) ( L  - p0) - o1J < (FN/M) + k.
Using the definition of N given in ( B) ,  ( All )  reduces to ( 10 ) . 
case (o), Suppose p0 + Cc2/<1 - fl) ] < L. Then
Ph= Pc+ Co2/<1 - fl) ), In this case (A4 )  and ( AS )  become
( Al l )  
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[FN/(1 - a) M] + k = Pc + [c2/C1 - p ) ] (A12) 
and 
(p - ap + a) M/pN = s. (A13)  
Solving for p and N gives (11)  and (12) , Clearly p e (0,1 ) ,  That 
Pc + [c2/C1 - p )J  < L is implied by (13) , The only issue rElllaining is
whether a single deviant can lower its price enough to induce all 
consumers to purchase randomly and still make nonnegative profits. 
The maximum price which will cause low cost consumers to purchase 
,. 
randomly is p = ph - N(c2 - c1 ) ,  or 
(A14) 
We then require average cost at M/N to be greater than �. but this
reduces directly to (14 ) .  
Case (d). That only single-price equilibria or two price equilibria 
can exist follows directly as in Salop and Stiglitz. 
Proof of Proposition 2: The proof of this proposition follows 
directly from Proposition 1 .  In case (a) ,  a =  F/(L - k)  comes 
Q, E,D, 
directly from (2) , As M � "'• (3) reduces to (17) and (4) becomes 
nonbinding. In case (b) ,  the two price equilibrium with Ph < L fails
to exist since when M � "'• N � "'• Thus no firm can effect the 
consumers• decisions by itself--any firm charging Ph could raise its
price to L without causing the high cost consumers to buy the price-
seller correspondence. Thus only the two price equilibrium with 
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Ph = Lis relevant. Here (18) and (19) are identical to (7) and (8) ,
and the constraint (10) is nonbinding, 
Q, E. D. 
Proof of Remark 3: Define Ni to be the largest integer such that
(A1 5) 
Then a consumer with information acquisition cost ci will not buy the
price-seller correspondence if more than Ni firms charge Pc• Hence if
all firms but one use a mixed strategy of � and it uses p, expected
profits are 
,. N-1-j(_.filL (1 N alMJ - P> j + 1 + 
N-1 "j ,. N j + )" cN-1>P  Cl _ P> -1- cM> J
j�1 
j N 
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+ (1 - p)(L - k){l - t )N-l(�) - F. (A16) 
In the case of finitely many consumers, the equilibrium mixed strategy 
is given by differentiating (A16 ) with respect to p and solving for p, 
This is not easy. As H 4 "' such that H/N 4 a, however, we can first 
take limits and then differentiate, Let 
i 
and 
Tl
N2-1 J:o < Njt>Pj<t _ p>N-1-j< j � 1>.
Net 
T = ) (N-lpj(l _ p) N-1-j(�) 2 
j!;w j j +
 1 ,
T3
- 2 
Net 
) (N-l) pj(l _ P>N-1-j [(l - a>Ml, 
j!;w j 
N J 2 
ll T4 = <Nj1>Pj(1 - p)N-1-j(�) .j 1 
Also, denote xi = (L - pi - ci) /(L - k - ci ) and note x2 < x1,
A 
Consider first T1• Multiplying and dividing by p, we have
since 
N 2 
N Aj A lim T1 = (o/P> lim f ( j)p (1 - p) N-jN 4"' N -)m j;;o 
lim < �>Po<1  - P>N = o = lim <:>PN(l - P>o.
N4"' N4"' 
(A17) 
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But the sum in (A17 ) is just the probability of N2 or fewer successes 
out of N independent Bernoulli trials, Hence 
N 
lim T1 = (o/p ) lim Pr[) Z/N 2. N2/NJN4"' N4"' bi 
- 2 
(o/p) lim Pr[Z l x2 + (fN/N ) JN4m 
where ff�} is a sequence of bounded fractions. Since lim f�/N = O,
N4"' 
- A 
and Z is a consistent estimator of p; i.e. for all s > O, 
it must be that 
lim Preli - pl > s] = O,
N4"' 
A 
if Xz 2 p { a/r. 
lim T1 =N 4"' 0 otherwise 
Similarly, we can rewrite T2 in such a way th.at 
Nl 
lim T2 = (aalP> lim � (�) pj(l - p)N-j
N4"' N4mJ-2tt 
N 
(aalP> lim Pr[N2+1! )zi �N1J N4m bi 
(A18) 
N 
= (aa/P> lim Pr[x2 + (1/N> + (�/N ) ! ) Zi .{ xi + (f�/N ) JN4"' f=1 
where again ff�} and ff�} are sequences of bounded fractions, Hence
The same procedures give 
otherwise 
and 
A 
{ a if Xi .{ p
lim T4 =N �., O otherwise . 
A A A 
Thus, aa M � "'• n(p,p) � n( p;p) where 
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A 
{p(pc-k ) ( aJP) - F if p .( X2 
+ ci-p)(L-k)a(i-a) - F= p(pc-k) [ (aafP> + a(i-a)] 
P <Pc-k)a + <i-p)(L-k)a - F
if x2
if xi 
A 
s p !.. 
... 
i p . 
(Ai9) 
From CAi9) it is immediate that an/ap > o if p ! x2 and a';/ap < o if
... ... 
P i  Xi· Thus only the case of x2 i P ! Xi is relevant. Here 
a';/ap =(pc - k ) a[CafP> + (i - a) J - ( L  - k)a(i - a) . (A20) 
A A A 
Setting 8n/ap = O in (A20), solving for p and letting P = P gives p as
in (i8), That x2 s p ! xi then reduces to (20).
O. E. D. 
Xi 
Proof of Proposition 3 :  The discussion following the Proposition 
outlines the proof which follawa closely that of Proposition i. 
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O. E. D. 
Proof of Proposition 4 :  The key to this result is the observation 
that when the number of firms ia finite if each uses the same mixed 
strategy then that strategy can only have a mass point at the 
competitive price. The argument ia well-known and follows that of 
Lemma i in Wilde and Schwartz ( i979) so will not be stated formally. 
The intuition ia given in the text following the Proposition. Given 
this result, it ia also immediate that the highest price in the 
support of the symmetric mixed strategy ia L. Finally, the support of 
the symmetric mixed strategy is either a set �.LJ for some pi p orc 
it is given by P0 ( where there will be a mass point) and a set [q,L]
where q > L. Fix the consumers• strategy a. Zero profits at L 
implies N = M(i - a)(L - k)/F. Furthermore profits on (p0,LJ, given
all other firms use the strategy G ( • ) are given by 
n(p)  = (i - a)(M/N)(p - k)(i - [i - G(p ) ] N-i)
+[Ma+ (M/N)(i - a)](p - k)[i - G(p)] N-i - F. (A21) 
This follows since i - [i - G(p ) JN-i is the probability of being the
lowest priced firm, in which case demand is Ma+ (M/N)(1 - a). 
Substituting for N from (26) and solving n(p )  = O for G ( p )  gives (28). 
A A A 
Setting G (p) 3 O and solving for p gives (29). If pi p0, then we're
done, but � 1 p0 if and only if a! [s ( L  - k) - f] /H ( L  - k) . Thia ia
case ( b ) ,  If this inequality fails, then there might be a mass point 
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at Pc' In this case profits above Pc are still given by (A21), but at 
A 
Pc' if G is the size of the mass point, 
n(pc) 
N-1 
(pc - k) J:0<Nll )gi(1 - G)N-l-i{[aM/(L + 1)) + [(1 - a)M/NJJ - F 
= (pc - k)(M/N)((l - a) + (a�)[l - (1 - a)NJ) - F. 
We cannot solve in closed form for Cl from CA22), but note 
A l'!l A A N-1 A N 311(pc)/aG = (pc - k)CM/N)(a/G )[GN(l - G) + (1 - G) - 1) 
Let f(1t) = �N(l - t))N-l + (1 - a)N, Then 
f'(�) = -(1 - a,N-2aN(N - 1) ! O, f(O) = 1 and f(l) = O. Hence 
� � A 
f(G) < 1 for G a (0,1) and an(pc)/aG < o. Furthermore, 
A 
n(pc) = (pc - k)(M/N)(l - a+ Na) - F for G = 0 and 
n(p ) = (p - k)(M/N> - F for (} = 1. Thus 0 < � < 1 requires c c 
(pc - k)(M/N)(l - a+ aN) - F > 0 > (pc - k)(M/N) - F. 
(A22) 
(A23) 
(A24) 
The left hand side of (A24) reduces to a > [s(L - k) - FJ/M{s - k) 
while the right hand side reduces to (25), i. e., a< 1 - [F/s{L - k)] , 
N ote that (25) implies a ! [s(L - k) - Fl/M(L - k), Thus case (a) 
occurs when 
[s(L - k) - FJ/M(L - k) <a< 1 - CF/a{L - k)], 
If there is a mass point at Pc, then there will be an interval of 
prices where G '(p) = o. It is bounded by q s (pc,L) such that 
G(q) = � where G(q) is given by (28), 
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Finally, since consumers all face cost c, they must be 
indifferent to buying the price-seller correspondence and random 
purchase. For any a satisfying (25) this means (30) must hold, If 
a> 1 - [F/s(L - k)J, all firms charge the competitive price, but then 
(30) holds only for c = O, which we have assumed away, 
Q. E. D. 
Proof of Proposition 5: The logic of this proof follows that of 
Proposition 4. The only difference is in the profit function, Thus 
in case (a) 
n(p) = [(1 - a1)a + (1 - a)] (M/N)(p - k){l - [1 - G(p)J
N-ll 
+ {Ma1a + ((1 - a1)a + (1 - a)J(M/N))(p - k)[l - G(p)]
N-1 - F 
and in case (b), 
n(p) = (1 - a2)(1 - a)CM/N)(p - k){l - [1 - G(p)]
N-l) 
 I H + (M[a + a2(1 - a)] + (1 - a2)(1 - a)(M N)}(p - k)[l - G(p)] - F, 
The remainder of the argument mimics Proposition 4. 
Q,E. D. 
Proof of Remark 5: If one firm always charges p0, there will never be
ties above pc so it is possible that the other N - 1 firms use a 
symmetric mixed strategy with mass points above pc' but only at L. 
Thus, if all but one of these firms uses 1t. profits for the remaining 
firm are 
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n (fl ;�) 
+ ( 1  - fl ) (L - k ) ( l  - a ) (H/N) - F .  
= fl (pc - k) (H/N) { ( l  - a) + Ca.H/il'2(N - 1 ) ) ( ( 1  - 1>
N - 1 + �NJ
+ (1 - fl ) (L - k ) ( l  - a ) (H/N) - F. 
Taking the derivative with respect to fl ,  and setting it equal to zero 
gives 
( pc - k) (H/N) { ( l - a) + £a.H/il'2 <N - 1 ) ) ( ( 1  - 1>
N - 1 + 1NJ
- (L - k) ( l  - a ) (H/N) = O .  (A2S) 
Zero profits at pc gives ( 44 ) , while ( 44)  plus (A
25 )  gives ( 45 ) .
Equation ( 46 )  implies consumers are indifferent to random purchase and 
buying the price-seller correspondence. The example follows. 
Proof of Proposition 6: Consider first o1 = o = o2 where o > o . 
First , notice that as H � � .  we will always be in case (a)  of 
Q ,E,D. 
Proposition 4 ;  i . e . , there will necessarily be a mass point at p0 •
Furthermore, it will be given by ( 1  - a )  + ( a/$> = s ( l  - a) (L - k) /F. 
Also, as H � � .  it can be shown that q � L, so the remaining mass is 
concentrated at L .  Hence ( 3 )  becomes flpc + (1 - fl ) L  - Pc = c.
Together these give a and fl as in ( 47 )  and ( 48 ) ,
Part (b ) , where c2 > c1 > o , follows in a similar way from
Proposition 5 .  The constraint a < a1 in part b(i )  keeps a2 > o and
the constraint a > a2 in b(iii) keeps a1 < 1 .  
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Q ,E ,D. 
Proof of Proposition 7: This resul t follows as Proposition 1 ,  part 
(a ) , Constraint (58 )  follows from n i N , since zero profits at L 
implies N = ( L  - k)H/F ,  
Q ,E ,D ,  
Proof of Proposition 8 :  This resul t follows direotly from taking 
limits in Proposition 7.
Q.E .D ,  
Proof of Proposition 9: The proof here is exactly the same as that of 
Proposition 4 except in this case the number of firms in the price-
seller correspondence purchased at cost c is n where n < N .  It is 
also the same for part (b) as the proof of Theorem 1 in Wilde and 
Schwartz except that G ( p) is interpreted as a mixed strategy and 
condition (66)  is needed to guarantee consumers will use a as a mixed 
strategy, 
Proof of Proposition 10 : Nothing in Proposition 9 depends on N 
Q .E .D. 
fini te, so Proposition 10 is a direct implication of that resul t .  
Q , E. D, 
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FOOTNOTF.S (1985) to prove his Proposition 5 .  
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Institute (Delhi Centre) for helpful suggestions on the proof of 
Remark 3. 
1. Salop and Stiglitz also consider the case in which o1 = o. I 
ignore this possibility in this paper in order to focus more 
clearly on the effects of costly information. 
2. I will ignore, as is standard , the integer problem with respect 
to �. 
3. See the proof of Remark 3 given in the appendix for a formal 
statement of the problem. 
4. Again, if o1 = o = o2 then the two price equilibrium given in (b)
exists if and only if consumers use a mixed strategy given by 
a =  ( L  - p0 - c)/( L  - k - c), See Remark 1,
5, See footnote 3 and Remark 1 for the case of o1 = o2 • 
6. That the single-price eq uilibrium at L always exists is analogous 
to the well-known result in sequential search models that given 
positive search costs the only eq uilibrium is degenerate at the 
monopoly price (e. g. , Burdett and Judd, 1983).
7 .  This argument is essentially the same as that used by Bagnoli 
8. In a related model, Burdett and Judd (1983) prove their analogue 
to H ( a) is unimodal. 
9. Bagnoli (1985) also noted the existence of these latter type of 
asymmetric equilibria is his modified version of the Salop­
Stigli tz model. 
10. Equilibria for the oases of o2 > o1 can be worked out in a 
fashion similar to that used in Sections 3 and 4. In the
interest of brevity I have not stated these results since the 
main points can be made when o1 = o = o2 apd o > o.
11. This result provides the motive for labeling this specification 
"the monopoly model. " 
12. The same uniqueness problem as that discussed in Remark 4 arises 
here (see footnote 8),
13. That inducing all consumers to shop might be profitable is not 
considered by Salop and Stiglitz. 
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